SafePay Ransomware
Threat Hunting Guide
LOLBins-Heavy Double Extortion Ransomware with Rapid 24-Hour Attack Cycle
Download the Complete Hunting Guide
Includes all 10 hunt modules, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, IOCs, and response procedures
Executive Summary
Critical Timing Window
- SafePay consistently achieves full network encryption within 24 hours of initial access
- 270+ victims since September 2024, with 73 claimed in May 2025 alone
- Non-RaaS model results in consistent TTPs across all attacks (more detectable)
- Heavy LOLBins usage creates multiple detection opportunities at each stage
SafePay is a rapidly emerging ransomware threat that has victimized over 270 organizations since its emergence in September 2024. Unlike most modern ransomware operations, SafePay does not operate as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), maintaining centralized control over all operations without affiliates.
Why This Matters for Defenders: SafePay's non-RaaS model results in highly consistent TTPs across all attacks, making detection signatures more reliable than typical ransomware hunts. The group's heavy reliance on Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) creates multiple detection opportunities at each stage of the attack chain.
Security researchers assess that SafePay operators likely have connections to disbanded threat actor groups including LockBit, ALPHV (BlackCat), and INC Ransomware. The ransomware binary shares significant code with LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black), built from the leaked source code from late 2022.
Hunt Modules
VPN/RDP Compromise Detection
ShareFinder.ps1 Reconnaissance
Windows Defender Tampering
UAC Bypass via CMSTPLUA
Lateral Movement (PsExec/WinRM)
Regsvr32 DLL Execution
Data Staging and Exfiltration
Shadow Copy Deletion
Process/Service Termination
Encryption Activity Detection
Detection Rules
ShareFinder.ps1 Network Reconnaissance
Detects PowerShell-based network share enumeration commonly used by SafePay
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational EventCode=4104 | search ScriptBlockText="*ShareFinder*" OR ScriptBlockText="*Invoke-ShareFinder*" OR ScriptBlockText="*Get-DomainShare*" | table _time, ComputerName, ScriptBlockText | head 100
Windows Defender Tampering
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender via PowerShell or registry
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security OR sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational | search CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*" OR CommandLine="*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*" OR CommandLine="*DisableAntiSpyware*" | table _time, ComputerName, User, CommandLine
Regsvr32 DLL Execution with Arguments
Detects regsvr32.exe executing DLLs with command-line arguments (SafePay locker pattern)
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security OR sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational | search process_name="regsvr32.exe" CommandLine="*.dll*" | where match(CommandLine, "regsvr32.*\.dll\s+\S+") | table _time, ComputerName, User, CommandLine, ParentCommandLine
ShareFinder.ps1 Network Reconnaissance
Detects PowerShell-based network share enumeration commonly used by SafePay
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ShareFinder", "Invoke-ShareFinder", "Get-DomainShare", "Get-NetShare")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
Windows Defender Tampering
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender via PowerShell or registry
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
"Set-MpPreference",
"DisableRealtimeMonitoring",
"DisableAntiSpyware",
"Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
Regsvr32 DLL Execution with Arguments
Detects regsvr32.exe executing DLLs with command-line arguments (SafePay locker pattern)
DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d) | where FileName =~ "regsvr32.exe" | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\.dll\s+\S+" | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
ShareFinder.ps1 Network Reconnaissance
Detects PowerShell-based network share enumeration commonly used by SafePay
title: SafePay - ShareFinder Network Reconnaissance
id: safepay-sharefinder-001
status: experimental
description: Detects ShareFinder.ps1 execution for network share discovery
author: Intruvent Technologies
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- ShareFinder
- Invoke-ShareFinder
- Get-DomainShare
- Get-NetShare
condition: selection
level: high
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1135
Windows Defender Tampering
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender via PowerShell or registry
title: SafePay - Windows Defender Tampering
id: safepay-defender-001
status: experimental
description: Detects Windows Defender manipulation via PowerShell
author: Intruvent Technologies
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- Set-MpPreference
- DisableRealtimeMonitoring
- DisableAntiSpyware
- Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath
condition: selection
level: critical
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.001
Regsvr32 DLL Execution with Arguments
Detects regsvr32.exe executing DLLs with command-line arguments (SafePay locker pattern)
title: SafePay - Regsvr32 DLL Execution with Arguments
id: safepay-regsvr32-001
status: experimental
description: Detects regsvr32 executing DLL with arguments (ransomware pattern)
author: Intruvent Technologies
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
CommandLine|re: '\.dll\s+\S+'
condition: selection
level: critical
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1218.010
Need More Detection Rules?
The full guide includes 25+ additional detection signatures covering all attack phases.
Disclaimer: These detection rules are provided for defensive security purposes. Always test rules in a non-production environment before deployment. Rules may require tuning based on your specific environment and baseline activity.
Key Indicators
File Artifacts
| Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
readme_safepay.txt |
Ransom Note | Dropped in encrypted directories |
.safepay |
File Extension | Applied to encrypted files |
locker.dll |
Ransomware Binary | Executed via regsvr32.exe |
ShareFinder.ps1 |
Discovery Tool | Network share enumeration |
Tools Used
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
ShareFinder.ps1 |
Network share discovery |
PsExec |
Lateral movement and remote execution |
WinRAR / 7-Zip |
Data staging for exfiltration |
FileZilla / Rclone |
Data exfiltration |
ScreenConnect |
Persistent remote access |
Key MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
| Technique ID | Name | SafePay Usage |
|---|---|---|
T1218.010 |
Regsvr32 | Ransomware DLL execution |
T1548.002 |
Bypass UAC | CMSTPLUA privilege escalation |
T1562.001 |
Disable Security | Windows Defender tampering |
T1490 |
Inhibit Recovery | Shadow copy deletion |
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